What does the Failure to Reason with "Respectively'' in Zero/Few-Shot Settings Tell Us about Language Models?

Ruixiang Cui, Seolhwa Lee, Daniel Hershcovich, Anders Søgaard

Main: Linguistic Theories, Cognitive Modeling, and Psycholinguistics Main-poster Paper

Poster Session 4: Linguistic Theories, Cognitive Modeling, and Psycholinguistics (Poster)
Conference Room: Frontenac Ballroom and Queen's Quay
Conference Time: July 11, 11:00-12:30 (EDT) (America/Toronto)
Global Time: July 11, Poster Session 4 (15:00-16:30 UTC)
Keywords: linguistic theories
TLDR: Humans can effortlessly understand the coordinate structure of sentences such as "Niels Bohr and Kurt Cobain were born in Copenhagen and Seattle, *respectively*". In the context of natural language inference (NLI), we examine how language models (LMs) reason with respective readings (Gawron and Kehl...
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Abstract: Humans can effortlessly understand the coordinate structure of sentences such as "Niels Bohr and Kurt Cobain were born in Copenhagen and Seattle, *respectively*". In the context of natural language inference (NLI), we examine how language models (LMs) reason with respective readings (Gawron and Kehler, 2004) from two perspectives: syntactic-semantic and commonsense-world knowledge. We propose a controlled synthetic dataset WikiResNLI and a naturally occurring dataset NatResNLI to encompass various explicit and implicit realizations of "respectively''. We show that fine-tuned NLI models struggle with understanding such readings without explicit supervision. While few-shot learning is easy in the presence of explicit cues, longer training is required when the reading is evoked implicitly, leaving models to rely on common sense inferences. Furthermore, our fine-grained analysis indicates models fail to generalize across different constructions. To conclude, we demonstrate that LMs still lag behind humans in generalizing to the long tail of linguistic constructions.